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NOTES ON AXIOMATIC REASONING
1.
Axiomatic reasoning has a long history. It has been used in many different
ways.  Aristotle  saw it  as  part  of what  he called  first  philosophy. Euclid
applied  it  to  geometry.  Archimedes  used  it  in  solving  statics  problems.
Ptolemy  studied  astronomical  models  by  it.  Spinoza  used  it  in  his
conceptual  demonstrations,  Newton  in  mechanics  and  optics,  Peano  in
number  theory,  Hilbert  in  geometry  and  physics,  Einstein  in  gravitation
theory,  Whitehead  and  Russell  in  logic.  Many  other  scientists  and
philosophers used it in different fields.
There was a common purpose in all  the different uses.  It  was to
provide a systematic investigation of the structures that are intended to be
characterized by axioms. The structures in  point are  physical  systems in
physics.  They are  sometimes  seen  as  systematic  overviews of  deductive
structures.  Obvious  enough,  inferences  from axioms  to  theorems  follow
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deductive patterns. A closer look at axiomatic reasoning however suggests
that the structures in question are not limited to deductive structures.
2.
For the purpose of providing a systematic study of relevant structures by
axiomatizations,  mainly  two  requirements  must  be  satisfied.  First,  as
complete  as  possible  characterization  of  the  structures  must  be at  hand.
Second,  some  non-informative  consequence  relations  must  be  in  the
investigator's logical tool box. The two requirements help in obtaining what
twentieth  century  logicians  would  call  the  “tautological”  character  of
statements  from  premises  to  conclusions  in  the  systems  axiomatized.
Complete characterizations would determine the reaches and boundaries of
reasoning  in  the  axiom systems.  Non-informative  consequence  relations
would determine the ways in which one could possibly find out results in
those reaches and boundaries.
It must be noted at this point that completeness may mean different
things for different purposes. For purely structural purposes, completeness
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is a goal to achieve in order to determine what there is to be studied by the
means  of  logical  reasoning,  without  leaving  any  question  open.   Such
determination presupposes that the structures in question (as well  as the
objects they involve) in some sense exist. Therefore, the consistency of the
axioms is presupposed from the beginning of the axiomatization process.
There are different ways to prove the consistency of the axioms of a
theory. This is due to the fact that the choice of the axioms can be motivated
in different ways.  Since truths and other non-falsities in a theory are all
(intended to be) determined by the axioms, they have to be in the reaches of
logical  consequences  drawn  from the  axioms.  If  the  structures  that  are
intended  to  be  studied  by  axiomatizations  do  not  exist  and  the  axiom
systems in question are not consistent, the whole process becomes nothing
but a meaningless manipulation of figures.
Consistency is understood in two ways, accordingly. One is where
the axioms are presupposed to hold true in the structures they determine.
Another is where they are presupposed to be not-false in the structures. In
both ways the ultimate presupposition of axiomatization is the existence of
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the structures and the objects involved. Hence consistency is presupposed in
axiomatizations from the very beginning.
3.
Determination  of  structures  both  in  physics  and  in  mathematics  (and
possibly in other fields) specify the subject matter that is intended to be
studied.  Usually  these  structures  are  called  physical  systems  or
mathematical  models.  Originally,  the  study  of  physical  systems  and
mathematical models on the basis of general principles of reasoning was
seen  as  part  of  philosophical  investigations.  For  instance,  Aristotle
summarized the general character of such study in the following way:
We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire
into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into substance.
Evidently, the inquiry into these also belongs to one science, and that the
science of the philosopher; for these truths hold good for everything that is,
and not for some special genus apart from others. And all men use them,
because they are true of being qua being and each genus has being. But men
use them just so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is, as far as the genus to
which  their  demonstrations  refer  extends.  Therefore  since  these  truths
clearly hold good for all things qua being (for this is what is common to
them), to him who studies being qua being belongs the inquiry into these as
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well. And for this reason no one who is conducting a special inquiry tries to
say  anything  about  their  truth  or  falsity,-neither  the  geometer  nor  the
arithmetician.  Some natural  philosophers  indeed have done so,  and their
procedure was intelligible enough; for they thought that they alone were
inquiring about the whole of nature and about being. But since there is one
kind of thinker who is above even the natural philosopher (for nature is only
one  particular  genus  of  being),  the  discussion  of  these  truths  also  will
belong to him whose inquiry is universal and deals with primary substance.
Physics  also  is  a  kind  of  Wisdom,  but  it  is  not  the  first  kind.-And the
attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be
accepted, are due to a want of training in logic; for they should know these
things already when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into
them while they are listening to lectures on it. (Metaphysics, Gamma 3)
Such  conception  of  the  study  of  axioms  is  quite  puzzling  from  the
perspectives of some received conceptions about axiomatic reasoning. The
idea of axiomatic reasoning is entangled conceptually and historically. It is
entangled with such ideas of logic, logical system, mathematical theorizing
and scientific  theorizing,  among others.  In  his  claim about  the  study of
axioms  in  first  philosophy  Aristotle  seems  to  have  been  aware  of  this
entanglement. Nevertheless, systematically and historically there have been
(and still are) different conceptions of axiomatic reasoning.
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4.
One can distinguish two main types of ideas here. In the historical material
they are hard to disentangle from each other. A tension between them is in
evidence already at early stages of the history of the method. On the one
hand, there is a deduction-oriented conception. On the other hand, there is a
model-oriented conception. Both terms (i.e. deduction- vs. model-oriented)
are historically inaccurate. In the early stages there was no explicit concept
of a model. In addition, the so-called deductive structures have not been
always  deductive  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  For  example,  Euclid's
axiomatization has been criticized to have deduction gaps. From a model-
oriented point of view however the so-called gaps are filled by continuity
assumptions. Even the status of a single point can be problematic thereof,
from the historical inaccuracy of the terms in question.
On the model-oriented conception what happens is this: A scientist
or mathematician wants to  study a certain class of structures.  She or he
captures them as models of an explicit axiom system. If this succeeds, the
class  of  structures  can  be  studied  purely logically.  That  is,  they can  be
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studied  without  the  input  of  any  new  information.  On  the  deduction-
oriented  conception,  axiomatization  amounts  spelling  out  the  cognitive
dependencies  between  different  items  of  information  one  possesses.
Typically the axioms  express the knowledge one already possesses. Other
truths are reached and/or justified by showing that they are consequences of
the axioms.
5.
Aristotle's conception of the axiomatic method can be seen as deduction-
oriented  in the following way: According to Aristotle, axioms speak about
real entities which have cognitive dependencies with further truths. That is
to  say  the  axioms  are  taken  to  be  true  as  well.  That  is,  their  logical
consequences belong to the same system of truths as the axioms. In such
system, we have some given knowledge in terms of the axioms. Starting
from the axioms we seek further knowledge by asking further questions.
The cognitive meaning of the axioms (as well as of the terms they involve)
is either obvious or definable by what is obvious. So that axioms do not
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require further proof. Unlike the axioms, further truths are deducible from
the axioms by syllogisms. (See Posterior Analytics)
On both deduction-oriented and model-oriented conceptions one has
to distinguish questions about choice of the axioms from questions about
the  rules  one  can  follow  in  drawing  inferences  from  them.  With  such
distinction the following question is  brought  about:  Can such inferences
bring  actual  new  information  about  the  structures  into  the  theory?
According to the deduction-oriented view they can. On the model-oriented
way they cannot.
The structures in question can be mathematical, physical (material),
social,  legal,  pure  structures  qua  structures  or  what  not.  The distinction
between  pure  structures  and  structures  actualized  in  some  medium was
originally unclear. It is best to take as paradigm example, a theory about the
actual  physical  world.  One  example  illustrating  the  two  different
orientations  is  the  totality of  Maxwell’s  equations  for  electromagnetism.
From the point of view of the model-oriented conception of the axiomatic
method  we  know  how  it  was  possible  to  build  electronic  devices  and
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components in the same way as building pure structures on the basis of a
tautological  logic  which  does  not  bring  into  the  argument  any  new
substantial information. In a sense the model of an electronic component for
example is a tautological consequence of the totality of Maxwell equations.
Its possible existence lurked there in the depths of Maxwell's theory from
the  very  beginning.  Similar  examples  can  be  produced  for  other
axiomatized theories as well.
What is especially interesting here are the different consequences of
the two main conceptions. For one thing, what can be said of the method of
deriving consequences from axioms? Here the model-oriented conception
has a strikingly clear logic. This logic must be tautological. That is, it must
not introduce any new substantial information into the reasoning. This is
because the whole idea is to be able to study the structures in question. In
this study the deduction of theorems from axioms is only a small part. It can
reveal only what all the models of the axioms have in common.
From the tautological  axiomatic deductions it  follows that  on the
model-oriented  view  all  structural  differences  disappear.  Pure  and
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interpreted axiom systems becomes on a par.  The logical structure of an
axiomatic theory is then independent of any meaning (interpretation) of the
non-logical constants of the theory.
6.
On the model-oriented view the axioms of a system do not occupy any
special position cognitively. All that they do is delineating the class of their
models. The axioms of a system need not be obvious. They need not be
certain. They need not be more reliable than the theorems. In so far as the
adoption  of  some  axioms  is  suggested  by  purely  structural  intuitions,
axioms and theorems have the same role. Their role is to specify models.
Eventually, being derivable from the axioms (even purely deductively) does
not per se enhance the cognitive status of a proposition.
In  all  these  respects  the  implications  of  the  deduction-oriented
picture  are  significantly  different  from  the  model-oriented  conception.
Historical examples belie the related terms. When Newton formulated his
experiment based optical theory he organized it in a form that might first
10
look like a Euclid-style axiom system with axioms, theorems, propositions,
problems  and  proofs.  But  after  having  presented  a  proposition  Newton
repeatedly  says  instead  of  presented  a  deductive  argument,  “proof  by
experiment”. That is due to his awareness of the need for correlating the
axiom system with observation. According to Newton, physical properties
of objects are considered as universal within the reaches of the experimental
setup. That makes approximations inevitable until further accuracies with
new axiomatizations and new experimental setups are found. In that sense
axioms can always  be revived by additional  assumptions  in  the  light  of
further evidence.  
As can be seen from the differences mentioned above, two kinds of
explorations of a class of structures axiomatically that do not fit into the
deduction-oriented  conception  are  largely  neglected  by  contemporary
philosophical discussions. These are (1) “how possible” arguments and (2)
exploration of the different structures captured by the axioms (plus suitable
additional assumptions). For one thing, a purely general theory (with only
universal  quantifiers)  does  not  have  empirical  consequences,  except  in
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conjunction with suitable boundary conditions, including initial conditions.
Newton, for example, tried to bridge what he called absolute magnitudes
with  sensible  ones  through  proofs  by  experiment  in  and  around  his
axiomatizations. (See Opticks)
7.
One of the most fundamental differences between the deduction-oriented
and model-oriented conceptions is that the consequence relation according
to  the  model-oriented  conception  is  semantical  (model-theoretical).  In
contrast,  in  the  deduction-oriented  conception  it  is  encapsulated  in  the
notion of logical system. This idea involved the assumption that the logic
needed is captured by a finite number of formal rules and inferences. In
view of  the  various  incompleteness  results  it  is  clear  that  this  notion  is
nearly useless. Few nontrivial “logical systems” are axiom systems in the
model-oriented sense and the construction of sundry “logical systems” has
little to do with actual mathematical practice.
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8.
Our  thesis  is  something  like  this:  In  actual  mathematical  practice,  any
attempt to axiomatize a theory involves explicitly or implicitly the overview
of the structures to be studied. If the characterization of structures by the
axioms  is  readable  from the  cognitive  meaning  of  the  axioms,  then  the
model theoretical work at the backstage is brought more to the front in the
shape of a deductive method. Otherwise, uses of the method are possibly
misled by deduction-oriented restrictions on the structures to be studied.
According  to  the  deduction-oriented  conception,  a  theory  is
axiomatized by reference to a division of labor between axioms and rules of
inference. In this division, the setting up of axioms is in order to express the
information content of a theory. That is done mainly by representation of
cognitive  meaning  of  certain  facts  of  the  theory,  by  writing  their
information content with the help of well-formed formulas. The inference
rules are applied then to the information content in order to derive theorems
from the axioms. Admittedly, in such conception the logic applied through
the uses of inference rules is preferred to have some preconditioned proof-
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theoretical  properties,  such as  the  requirements  of  what  logicians  call  a
logical system.
In  the  model-oriented  conception,  a  theory  is  axiomatized  by
reference to division of labor not between axioms and rules of inference,
but  between  axioms  and  a  much  wider  domain  of  logical  construction
principles. The wider domain in question can be called principles of thought
experimentation. For the purpose of applying them, what is required is only
the following: no new information must be introduced into the arguments in
model  constructions.  Clear  enough,  this  requirement  does  not  mean  to
forbid the use of inference rules. They can be explained in terms of the logic
of  thought  experimentation.  Therefore,  the  logic  applied  in  the  model-
oriented conception is a logic of model construction. It has no preconditions
about  the  proof  constructions  other  than  what  the  general  experimental
rationale of axiomatic reasoning requires.
9.
There  has  been an apprehension of  syntactic  precision  in  the  studies  of
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some logicians in the past two centuries. Frege and Quine are two of the
foremost  influential  representative  names  among  the  logicians  in  point.
Their  achievements  of  precision,  like  similar  achievements  of  other
thinkers,  seem to have been in  book pages for paradoxical reasons.  The
deductive purposes of logical theorizing in their works presupposed that the
material studied is like a precious abacus which should be protected against
falling into pieces by a mistake. The thought mechanism underlying such
works seems to be a defensive one. It is based on a misleading conception
of axiomatic reasoning and its possible uses. One can find how infectious
such conception can be, by observing that even the most model-oriented
logicians  had  fallen  into  misleading  phrases  concerning  the  general
conception  of  logic  and the axiomatic  method.  For  example,  in  Tarski’s
Introduction to Logic, first paragraph says this:
Every scientific theory is a system of sentences which are accepted as true
and which may be called LAWS or ASSERTED STATEMENTS, or,  for
short, simply STATEMENTS. In mathematics, these statements follow one
another in a  definite  order according to certain principles which will  be
discussed in detail in Chapter VI [under the title ON THE DEDUCTIVE
METHOD],  AND  THEY  ARE,  AS  A  RULE,  ACCOMPANIED  BY
CONSIDERATIONS  INTENDED  TO  ESTABLISH  THEIR  VALIDITY.
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Considerations of this kind are referred to as PROOFS, and the statements
established by them are called THEOREMS.
That  is  not  the flexibility of  research that  Hilbert  intended in axiomatic
reasoning at all.  For example he wrote in a letter to Frege:
Nor can one be too exacting in examining the propositions, for after all they
are only propositions of the theory. However, the more developed a theory
is  and the more ramified its  structure,  the more self-evident  will  be the
manner of its application to the world of appearances; and it would require
a large measure of bad intentions indeed if one wanted to apply the more
precise propositions of plane geometry or Maxwell’s theory of electricity to
appearances other than the ones for which they were intended….
The  idea  of  deductive  systematization  in  the  sense  of  the  study of  the
relations  between  axioms  and  their  possible  results,  as  well  as  the
assumption that axioms must be true statements from the very beginning,
create the main misconception about the axiomatic method.
In the way Tarski defines the axiomatic method, number theory, for
example, can be axiomatized as a deductive system. Due to incompleteness
results, however, the axiomatization will exclude certain true statements of
the system as being not deducible, or not provable from the axioms of the
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axiom system. In order to capture them as well,  the deductive system in
question  can  be  extended  by  adding  new  axioms  for  each  step  of
incompleteness  phenomena  in  the  initial  system.  Such  a  step  by  step
(conservative) extensions of a deductive system, no matter how carefully
studied  in  tandem with  its  models,  show nothing but  the  existence  of  a
deductive  hierarchy  of  true  but  not  provable  statements.  That  kind  of
hierarchy is considered as a characteristic feature of the axiomatic method
in the twentieth century philosophy of mathematics. The reason why it is
considered  so  is  simply  that  the  axiomatic  method  has  been  generally
understood by reference to the deduction-oriented conception. Even if the
models  of  the  deductive  hierarchy  are  studied,  for  example  by  set
theoretical or predicative tools, those studies would not suffice to meet the
general  thought  experimental  conceptualizations  about  mathematical  or
otherwise scientific truths. Such insufficiency has been criticized by various
critics. Their target was sometimes the axiomatic method itself. 
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10.
Axiomatic method in the wrong hands creates nothing but proof hierarchies.
Those  hierarchies  might  be  found  insightful  in  some  specialized  proof-
theoretical  searches.  In  general  philosophical  sense  they  provide  no
substantial insight about the notions of truth, consistency, existence etc..
Still the truth or proof hierarchies (as their analogues in recursive
hierarchies)  are  being  used  in  programmatic  aims  in  philosophy.  For
example, there are the so-called axiomatic theories of truth. Such theories
are  duplications  of  the  Tarski’s  undefinability  theorem.  There  are  Gödel
hierarchies  in  meta-mathematics,  and  there  are  Tarski  hierarchies  in
semantics. A more recent source of such hierarches is found in Feferman’s
so-called transfinite recursive “progressions” of axiomatic systems. All are
rooted  from  the  same  source:  the  deduction-oriented  conception  of
axiomatization. 
11.
Tarski, although his work on deductive method is occasionally misleading
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in logic about the real model-oriented features of axiomatic reasoning, he
himself and logicians who were also mathematicians were not misled most
of the time. Simply due to appeals to abstract algebraic methods, in tandem
with first-order axiomatizations, Tarski’s own methods were on safe ground,
model theoretically. They were safe in the sense that model theory comes
very close to algebraic geometry, when one tries to define it in algebraic
terms.  For  example,  Wilfrid  Hodges  defines  it  as  the  sum of  algebraic
geometry  and  the  theory  of  fields.  Similarly  Chen  Chung  Chang  and
Howard Jerome Keisler define it as Universal Algebra plus Logic. However
safe ground Tarski’s model theoretical methods were on, its logic was not
so.  The  deduction-oriented  conception  of  logic  and  axiomatic  reasoning
with their truth and proof hierarchies cannot be taken as realistic solutions
to basic problems of methodology.
12.
Deductive  methods  and  model-theoretical  methods,  both  being  formal
methods,  have  a  confusing  record  of  history.  They  mainly  belong  to
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twentieth  century  philosophy  of  mathematics.  The  study  of  deductive
methods can be classified under the development of the so-called natural
deduction methods.  Systematization of model-theoretical methods can be
classified  as  a  development  of  the  work  in  the  theory  of  truth.  Both
deduction-oriented and model-oriented methods have further developments
in different branches of mathematics, computer science, cognitive science
and other fields. Sometimes they are misleadingly combined as in the case
of what are known as axiomatic theories of truth.
The confusions are perhaps due to Tarski’s conceptualizations about
the so-called methodology of deductive sciences, and his construction of the
deductive method for the  purposes of axiomatizing theories. Further back
the  same  confusions  are  rooted  in  Frege’s  misconceptions  about  the
axiomatic method. The historical roots of both the deduction and model-
oriented conceptions of axiomatic method go back to earlier times than the
beginning of the twentieth century.
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13.
Tarski’s  conception  of  the  axiomatic  method  as  an  example  of  the
deduction-oriented conception may be found unfair. It is true that Tarski’s
work is some kind of a starter for model theoretical investigations in the
twentieth century. However, it is a borderline case. It is a borderline case
with  respect  to  formulation  and  definition  of  an  axiomatic  theory.  The
reason  for  it  is  that  it  presupposes  the  completeness  of  the  underlying
quantification theory of axiomatizations. That is completeness in the sense
of  recursive  enumerability  of  all  the  theorems  in  a  so-called  deductive
theory. Tarski puts such restriction in the following way:
Every theorem of a given deductive theory is satisfied by any model of the
axiom  system  of  this  theory;  and  moreover,  to  every  theorem  there
corresponds a general statement which can be formulated and proved within
the framework of logic and which establishes the fact that the theorem in
question is satisfied by any such model.
We  have  here  a  general  law  from  the  domain  of  the  methodology  of
deductive sciences which, when formulated in a slightly more precise way,
it  is  known  as  the  LAW  OF  DEDUCTION  (or  the  DEDUCTION
THEOREM).
14.
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In Tarski’s view the deductive method is “justifiably considered the most
perfect of all methods employed in the construction of sciences”. There lie
all the borderline case confusions about theories and their models. For one
reason,  the  most  perfect—if  we  want  to  use  the  word  perfect—of  all
methods is not deductive but thought experimental.
The  historical  background  of  the  deductivist  conception  of  the
axiomatic method lies in Frege’s confusions about Hilbert’s axiomatic work
on  geometry.  One  quotation  makes  it  sufficiently  clear  that  Frege
completely  misunderstood  the  model  theoretical  conception  of  the
axiomatic method.  Frege wrote,
Axioms do not contradict  one another, since they are true; this does not
stand in need of proof. … The usage of words “axiom” and “definition” as
presented in this paper is, I  think, the traditional and the most expedient
one.
Axioms  do  not  contradict  one  another  if  they  are  shown  to  be  not
contradicting each other. That is shown by building a model for the axioms.
That  is  clearly  so  from  the  point  of  the  model-oriented  conception  of
axiomatic method.
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Tarski’s  borderline  considerations  about  deductive  methodology
were  in  the  1940s.  In  the  1950s  the  method  of  semantic  tableaus  was
discovered and developed. It showed a way to cancel out the borderlines
and build the models and logical consequences of axioms (or of any set of
statements) with the help of some definitory and strategic rules of model
building. In that light the bridge construction between model-oriented and
deduction-oriented conceptions of axiomatizations has been shown to be
completable. However, the whole gist of semantic tableaus is their rules of
model  construction.  It  is  not  their  rules  of  inference.  In  that  sense  the
method of semantic tableaus has been a continuation of the model-oriented
tradition in the same sense as Hilbert’s axiomatic work was.
15.
Right from the beginning of his career Hilbert programmed a set of meta-
theoretical  problems  to  investigate  from a  meta-logical  perspective.  The
separation of the historical cases of deduction-oriented and model-oriented
methods has  taken place right  after  that,  partly as a  consequence of his
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meta-mathematical work in the nineteen twenties. No such separation was
questioned in that time. Even today, the distinction is not sufficiently clear
to many philosophers.
It would be crude perhaps if the whole tradition of the axiomatic
method  in  the  twentieth  century  is  reduced  to  Hilbert’s  discoveries.
However, it is also true that popular remembrance of Hilbert’s fame is under
the heading of an unsuccessful formalism. That is a big misconception of
the  twentieth  century  philosophy  of  mathematics.  Still  philosophers  are
calling Hilbert a formalist. (Using a mask for a guilty secret will not make
the  misunderstanding  disappear.)  In  reality,  Hilbert’s  philosophy  of
mathematics  is  at  least  potentially  (but  history  teaches  that  it  was  also
actually) the offspring of almost every kind of genuine investigation in the
foundations of science in the twentieth century. The label formalism cannot
be more than a result of sacrificing Hilbert on the altar of misconceptions
about the truth of the matter.
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16.
Hilbert was a philosopher of science. Arguably he was one of the greatest.
He was more interested in “solution sets” rather than singled out solutions
to problems. This does not make him a higher-order logician or a computer
scientist.  The  sets  of  solutions  he was after  can be  seen  in  his  work in
invariant  theory,  or  in  the  foundations  of  geometry.  Thereof  the  idea  of
solution  sets  can  be  used  to  explain  his  axiomatic  thoughts.  His  sixth
problem, which is a call to axiomatize physical theories, is a suggestion to
investigate possible sets of solutions to problems of physical theories by
way of axiomatic analysis, by developing a model-oriented conception of it.
What  was  model-oriented  in  axiomatic  reasoning,  according  to
Hilbert?  Or did he also have  a  deduction-oriented  conception?  From an
abstract  algebraic  point  of  view,  the  answer  is  simple.  He  had  a  very
sensible model-oriented conception of the axiomatic method. This can be
seen as follows: Following Wilfrid Hodges if we define model theory as
algebraic geometry + field, we may ask: Who build the camp fire of the
foundations of algebraic geometry? Hilbert,  mainly by proving the Basis
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Theorem. 
[Some historical notes about the development of model theory may
be helpful in seeing the general interrelations between different traditions in
the  history  of  logic.  We  must  separate  the  subject  matter  into  two:  (1)
Development of model  theory and model-oriented techniques  by way of
axiomatic or otherwise algebraic  methods in the general development  of
logic(s); (2) Development of the axiomatic method and its model-oriented
and deduction-or conceptions.]
17.
Model theory was born with the theorem of Löwenheim about the relation
between  models  and  countable  models.  Löwenheim's  work  was  a
continuation of what is called these days the algebraic tradition in logic. It
starts  with  Boole’s  work  and  continues  with  Schröder’s  and  Peirce’s.
Logicians  like  Skolem  and  Tarski  can  also  be  seen  as  to  have  partly
contributed to the same line of thought. Their work in clarifications of the
model theoretical thought in logic can be studied as part of (1). However,
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they can also be studied as falling under (2) with respect to their critical
positions in the historical development of elementary logic.
As a matter of fact, the so-called algebraic tradition is a neglected
part of the history of logic. In the 1890s Hilbert was shaping his new ideas
about the model-oriented conception of the axiomatic method, in algebraic
varieties,  projective  geometry,  and  general  geometry.  The  philosophy of
mathematics  of  algebraic  logicians,  who  applied  algebraic  ideas  to
mathematical logic were in the same neighborhood as Hilbert’s or Husserl’s
philosophies  of  mathematics.  Partly  because  of  the  reasons  why  such
neighborhood of philosophies is studied today as a neglected part  of the
history of logic, the model-oriented conception of the axiomatic method,
which  was  common  to  all  that  has  been  neglected,  has  been  poorly
understood  by  philosophers  and  the  mathematicians.  One  of  the  grand
mistaken results of the twentieth century philosophy of mathematics is the
unfortunate label of Hilbert’s philosophy as “formalism”.
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18.
Hilbert’s  philosophy  of  mathematics,  as  has  been  slowly  recognized  in
recent studies, can be seen as a synthesis between three or four different
traditions in the history of logic, viz. algebraist,  logicist,  intuitionist,  and
even  cognitivist.  Partly  from  that  synthesis,  in  the  1930s,  Kurt  Gödel
extracted  completeness  and  incompleteness  results,  Tarski  extracted
definability  and  decidability  results,  Church  extracted  computational
results,  Turing  extracted  the  general  form of  “computors”,  and Gentzen
extracted  consistency results.  How come then Hilbert’s  program was an
unsuccessful  formalism,  and  on  the  other  hand  Gödel  was  a  successful
Platonist, or Tarski was a successful model theorist, or Church and Turing
were successful computation theorists, or (most importantly) Gentzen was a
successful  (Hilbertian)  proof  theorist?  The  answer  seems  to  lie  in  the
misconceptions about the model-oriented conception of axiomatic method
in the twentieth century.
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19.
In  the  year  1899  Hilbert’s  Grundlagen  der  Geometrie  was  published.
Poincaré’s  review  of  Hilbert’s  book  summarizes  the  model  theoretical
import  (as  well  as  its  deductive  import)  of  Hilbert’s  accomplishment.
Poincare mainly refers to the proof of consistency of the axioms and the
completeness of the axioms in a descriptive sense, from the viewpoint of
the mathematician. Frege however, was confused about what Hilbert calls
axioms, definitions and other things. He thought those words were not used
in their traditional sense as he understood the so-called traditional sense.
And he thought  they were not “expedient” enough. He wrote a  letter  to
Hilbert and asked questions about the points he did not quite understand. In
Hilbert’s reply to Frege we find the most characteristic features of a model-
oriented conception of axiomatic method:
In other words, each and every theory can be applied to infinitely many
systems of  basic  elements.  For  one merely has  to  apply a  univocal  and
reversible one-to-one transformation and stipulate that the axioms for the
transformed things  be  correspondingly similar.  Indeed,  this  is  frequently
applied, for example in the principle of duality, etc.; I also apply it in my
independence proofs.  The totality of assertions  of  a  theory of electricity
does of course hold of every other system of things substituted in place of
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the  concepts  magnetism,  electricity,  … just  as  the  required  axioms  are
fulfilled. However, the state of affairs just indicated can never be a short
coming of a theory, and in any case is unavoidable.
Later Weyl called Hilbert’s work a “move to the meta-geometric level”. His
reason  was  understandable  enough.  Hilbert’s  axiomatization  and
investigation of the dependency relations between the axioms was not only
about Euclidean geometry or some other singled out specific geometry. It
was  about,  in  general,  how  to  build  Cartesian,  Archimedean,  non-
Archimedean, non-Euclidean and other possible geometries on the basis of
different sets of axioms characterizing different spaces and different classes
of geometric models.
Hilbert’s proof of the consistency of the five groups of axioms he
introduced is a model theoretical proof. It shows how the axioms can be
satisfied by an arithmetical model. That is, by using numbers as the objects
of  the  constructed  models  of  geometry.  When Hilbert’s  grouping  of  the
axioms is  observed, it  is plain to the eye that notions like incidence (or
projection),  order, and congruence of the objects investigated,  as well as
their  continuity  properties  and  parallelism  as  giving  the  shape  of  the
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Euclidean models are put together in a model theoretically (descriptively)
complete form, as an organic whole, which can be identified as an object by
itself  from  the  perspective  of  model-oriented  foundations.  That  was
sufficiently meta-theoretical systematization for model theoretical purposes
around the end of nineteenth century. There had been no mathematical logic
or axiomatizations of set theory yet. (Hilbert had not contributed to those
fields  yet.)  The  pointed  out  descriptions  of  geometries  were   model
identifications, not only the identification of some domains of deductions
from axioms to theorems.
20.
In  the  model-oriented  conception  of  axiomatic  reasoning,  objects  of  a
theory are taken as being given. So that whenever we say that something
exists, it really has to exist in our models. The purpose of the axioms is to
define  how things  behave in  our  models,  i.e.  how they are  interrelated;
dependent on, independent of each other etc. When the models are defined
by the axioms, one has to prove that no contradiction arises from the whole
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characterization. That is, we show that the models really exist.
21.
In  1934,  in  their  joint  work  Grundlagen  der  Mathematik Hilbert  and
Bernays took axiomatization of geometry still of the central importance for
their  model-oriented  conceptualizations.  In  the  first  chapter  of  the  two
volumes,  axiomatic method in refined form was perfected in accordance
with the latest  developments in  different  fields up to  date.  Whether  two
relations R and S satisfy a given condition in the system, say whether for
any given R and S, A(R, S) or not A(R, S) is true became one of the most
central questions. Hilbert and Bernays introduce such question as a decision
problem.  The  introduction  of  the  decision  problem  by  no  means
presupposed that the decision problem at hand was restricted to a problem
of mechanical derivability or deducibility etc. On the basis of the simple
formulation  of  the  decision  problem,  Hilbert  and  Bernays  formulated
problems  of  consistency  and  independence  of  the  axioms,  by  asking
whether a set of axioms G and a given axiom A are satisfiable by a domain,
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or whether A is independent in the sense that G and not A were consistent.
These  tasks  can  be  accomplished,  as  was  stated  in  the  Grundlagen,  by
formulating logical inferences and showing that a given axiom system AX
is satisfied by a model M of things and relations. Whether the formulation
of  the  logical  inferences  was  to  be  restricted  to  mechanical  rules  of
provability  was  the  question.  It  didn’t  have  an  answer  then.  The
incompleteness results were fresh. However, the main point was not stated
to formulate a deductive system but a system of things and relations, viz.
the existence of models, as in the days of meta-geometric investigations of
the  1890s.  What  Hilbert  had  shown in  his  earlier  work  by proving the
consistency of geometry axioms was the existence of models for different
geometries (and how to build them) in the same sense as the satisfiability
relation considered in the Grundlagen der Mathematik in 1934.
In his 1900 address Hilbert had mentioned similarity of devices and
relationship of the ideas in mathematics. He was aware then that for the
purposes of working out the model-oriented study of axioms, development
of  an  underlying  logical  theory  was  essential.  The  model-oriented  and
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deductive  features  of  axiomatic  method  necessitated  an  uninformative
inferential net to study consequence relations in an axiomatized theory. That
didn’t  necessarily mean to locate  the procedures  of  the underlying logic
under the title of logical inference rules only.
22.
Hilbert  worked  out  the  difference  between  axiomatization  of  logic  and
axiomatization of non-logical theories. Hilbert’s practicing of the axiomatic
method in several fields in tandem shows that the logical constants vs. non-
logical constants distinction was not essential for him in the axiomatizations
in so far as the intended models are characterized completely. However, he
mentions the necessity of reaching a clear-cut distinction someday. As has
been  considered  since  then  there  have  been  different  senses  of
completeness. Truth in an axiom system meant truth in the intended and
only in the intended models. In axiomatizations of (parts of) logic, the goal
was to capture truth in all possible models. There we observe a distinction
between two different kinds of information.
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With its meta-theoretical levels Hilbert’s work in logic was unique
as in the case of his work in geometry.  That uniqueness plays a central role
in the development of the sciences in so far as the rationale of the axiomatic
method and Hilbert’s contributions to it understood correctly.
23.
Why was axiomatization so important for Hilbert? The main part  of the
answer has already been delivered: As soon as an axiom system is set up,
assuming that it has models, it offers an overview on the class of its models.
Thereby an axiomatization is a means to develop an structural investigation
on  the  information  codified  by  the  resulting  axiom system.  By solving
problems,  the  theoretical  investigator  or  the  practical  inventor  puts  the
information to use by exploring what there is to be found out about those
models. This is done by thought experiments on the model constructions, on
the basis of axioms and the model construction rules.
Surely the deepening of an axiom system can as well be studied by
reflecting  on  the  different  particular  aspects  of  a  mathematical  theory
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without using any axiomatic approach. There is no unbreakable law that no
one  can  obtain  a  better  systematic  overview  of  a  mathematical  theory
without using the axiomatic method. 
It would be an oversimplification perhaps to say at this point that
axiomatic  research  was  for  Hilbert  an  end  in  itself  without  external
philosophical  justifications.  No  matter  which  philosophical  justifications
have been sowed for it, we have to find them grow as a separate branching
of thoughts from the internal working of axiomatic thought experiments.
Axiomatic  method  had  always  been  a  means  to  achieve  a  clearer
understanding  of  mathematical  theories,  according  to  Hilbert.  He
emphasized that the method forced itself upon his research, rather than it
flourished as a branch of personal foundational preferences.
In the historical development of Hilbert’s work as an axiomatist, it is
plain to the eye that his different applications (as well as the approval of
others axiomatizations) match with different periods of heated dispute on
the  foundations  of  different  fields  in  logic,  mathematics,  and  physics.
Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry corresponded, for example, to the end
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of  that  period  of  epistemological  disputes  on  the  Euclidean  and  non-
Euclidean  geometries.  His  encouragement  and  approval  of  the
axiomatization  of  set  theory  corresponded  to  the  end  of  the  period  of
ontological  disputes  on  infinity  partly  as  a  result  of  the  set  theoretical
paradoxes. His call for the axiomatization of physical theories corresponded
exactly to those dates when theories of special and general relativity as well
as  the  discovery  of  the  quantum  phenomena  were  about  to  shake  the
grounds.  Hilbert’s  affirmation  of  the  Russell  and  Whitehead’s
axiomatization of the predicate logic,  and taking over some parts  of the
unfinished project from a meta-logical perspective corresponded to the days
when intuitionistic motivations in epistemology were about to cut  the tree
of quantificational logic in its young age. These examples are enough to
show Hilbert’s quickness to respond different crisis periods.
What was common to different crisis periods in geometry, set theory
and  physics  is   that  in  each  case  there  appeared  epistemological  and
ontological issues which were taken to be reasons as to admit some of the
theories as correct (true) and some of them incorrect (not true). This whole
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issue, it seems, according to Hilbert’s viewpoint, was ill-formed. The main
source of the ill-conceived issues (especially in mathematics, but also in
physics)  was  due  to  the  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  model-oriented
conception of axiomatizations and of the absence of epistemological and
ontological concerns in such a conception. Expanded briefly, the absence of
epistemological and ontological (or otherwise empirical) concerns is due to
a  distinction  we  have  to  make—and  Hilbert  assumed  such  distinction
implicitly—between  uninterpreted  axiom  systems  and  interpreted  axiom
systems.  The  distinction  perhaps  can  best  be  explained  by  means  of
Einstein’s observation in his “Geometry and Experience” paper: “As far as
the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, and as far as
they are certain, they do not refer to reality.” What Einstein means here is
simply that we separate “the logical-formal” from its “objective or intuitive
content”.  Thereby  we  separate  the  uninterpreted  axiomatizations  from
interpreted  axiomatizations.  Hence,  by doing  so,  the  applications  of  the
axiomatic  method (in  its  uninterpreted  sense)  provides  the possibility of
various foundational investigations which are freed from epistemological or
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ontological concerns; and hence from crises in the sciences.
To take one example with a closer look we can go back to Poincaré’s
criticism  of  Hilbert’s  early  consistency  proof  sketch  for  the  axioms  of
number theory. In order to prove such consistency for the general case, as
Poincaré  quickly  realized,  Hilbert  needed  to  use  the  principle  of
mathematical induction.  The principle of mathematical induction,  for the
complete description of Hilbert’s axiomatization, had to be considered also
as  one  of  the  axioms  of  number  theory  of  which  consistency  was  in
question. Poincaré in his 1906 paper criticized Hilbert’s argument on this
point. He pointed out that Hilbert’s appeal to mathematical induction in his
proof was circular reasoning:
…the point at issue is reasoning by recurrence and the question of knowing
whether a system of postulates is not contradictory
…
A demonstration is necessary.
The only demonstration possible is the proof by recurrence.
This is legitimate only if we regard it not as a definition but as a synthetic
judgment.
Poincaré also took Hilbert’s line of thought to have assumed the principle of
39
mathematical induction as a synthetic a priori principle. However, assuming
its implicit model-oriented background, Hilbert’s argument did not involve
any  epistemological  concerns.  In  fact  it  was  Hilbert’s  aim  to  eliminate
epistemological  presuppositions  from  the  formulation  of  foundational
problems;  in  this  case,  from the  meta-mathematical  problem concerning
mathematical  induction.  Hilbert’s  later  response  to  Poincaré  makes  this
point  sufficiently  clear.  The  reason  why Hilbert’s  argument  appeared  to
have  involved  epistemic  elements  is  presumably  the  then  missing  (then
forthcoming) developments in logical theory, which Hilbert was searching
for.  Hilbert’s  own later  remark  on Poincaré’s  challenge  is  that  it  was  a
mistake  on  Poincaré’s  part  that  he  rejected  Hilbert’s  theory  in  its
“inadequate  early  stages”.  The  source  of  Poincaré’s  mistaken  view,
according to  Hilbert,  was  that  Poincaré did not  distinguish between two
different methods of induction:
Poincaré…denied from the outset the possibility of a consistency proof for
the arithmetic axioms, maintaining that the consistency of the method of
mathematical induction could never be proved except through the inductive
method itself.  But  as  my proof  theory shows,  two distinct  methods that
proceed recursively come into play when the foundations of arithmetic are
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established,  namely,  on  the  one  hand,  the  intuitive  construction  of  the
integers  as  numeral  (to  which  there  also  corresponds,  in  reverse  the
decomposition  of  any  numeral,  or  the  decomposition  of  any concretely
given array constructed just as an array is), that is, contentual induction, and
on the other hand, formal induction proper, which is based on the induction
axiom and through which alone the mathematical variable can begin to play
its role in the formal system.
It could still be questioned at this point whether or to what extent Poincaré
was right in his general epistemological criticism based on the synthetic a
priori  character of mathematical induction.  However,  the epistemological
force of Poincaré’s criticism made such a discussion uninteresting to run the
programmatic aims of Hilbert for the purposes of developing an axiomatic
approach as a tool for model constructions, as they have been presented in
his other reactions to different possible crises in the sciences. On similar
lines there was no need for an appeal to any basic intuition in the sense that
intuitionist  philosophy  of  mathematics  suggested  in  our  foundational
theorizing,  according  to  Hilbert.  Foundations  could  be  studied
mathematically  by  improving  the  logical  methods  on  a  meta-theoretical
level, i.e. meta-logic and meta-mathemaics were to be developed in tandem,
as  is  known to  be  the  case  in  the  actual  historical  development  of  the
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subjects. What this meant was that the exclusion of certain principles like
the  axiom  of  infinity,  the  axiom  of  reducibility  and  the  axiom  of
completeness from meta-mathematics was for the sake of showing that a
model-oriented  conception  of  axiomatic  foundations  did  not  need  such
assumptions. It could be developed without making existential assumptions
about  mathematical  infinity  or  similar  notions.  Such  claim  immediately
implied that Hilbert's preference was a first-order level theorizing in meta-
mathematical theory. It could be applied to different mathematical domains
without  making  actual  assumptions  about  infinite  totalities  etc.  On  this
point, epistemological interpretations of Hilbert’s views were and are based
on patent misconceptions about on the one hand Hilbert’s  philosophy of
mathematics  and on the other,  the model  oriented conceptions about  the
axiomatic  thought.  All  that  was  (and  still  is)  needed  for  foundational
purposes is  first  the  determination of models by axiomatic  analysis,  and
then, second, model-theoretical consistency proofs for the axiomatizations.
This was Hilbert’s original project.
In addition to his axiomatization of geometry, Hilbert worked on the
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axiomatization of different mathematical and physical theories. He started
teaching physics from the 1890s on.  He continued teaching foundational
courses in physics until the end of his career. A typical Hilbert course is told
to have been including his latest axiomatizations of almost all the physical
theories with the addition of axiomatizations of arithmetic and logic. This is
told to be taking place in the one semester courses. It is not probable that he
taught all  the theories moving from one to another by spending time on
details  or  deductive  precision.  Even  that  should  suffice  to  see  Hilbert’s
model-oriented conception as a background of his foundational theorizing.
As  is  well  known,  Hilbert’s  sixth  Paris  problem  was  about
axiomatization of physical theories. He claimed there that the investigations
on the foundations of geometry suggested that physical sciences must be
axiomatized. Especially those, in Hilbert’s opinion, in which mathematics
has a crucial role, were to be axiomatized. What he meant by that, as he
mentioned,  were probability and mechanics in the first  place.  As a later
continuation of these programmatic aims to axiomatize physical theories,
Hilbert’s  1917  address  to  the  Swiss  Mathematical  Society  entitled
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“Axiomatische  Denken”  was  devoted  to  emphasizing  the  importance  of
different examples of the application of the axiomatic method to different
mathematical and physical theories. Hilbert’s conception of the axiomatic
method  there  was  again  far  from  being  based  on  a  deduction-oriented
conception. The content of the paper makes it very clear how Hilbert related
different fields that he carried out in his investigations under the roof of
axiomatic thought, with an archetypel model-oriented conceptualization.
24.
Geometry  always  had  a  central  role  in  Hilbert’s  use  of  the  axiomatic
method.  His  lectures  can  be  portrayed  as  a  stream  of  geometric
transformations from theories to theories. It is told that one could find in his
one  semester  course  most  of  the  theories  of  physics  more  or  less
axiomatized  and  in  addition  geometry,  algebra  and  mathematical  logic
axiomatized. It is obvious that he was not a crazy proof theorist or crazy set
theorist. He was a crazy model-theorist. In one semester all axiomatizations
could be surveyed without getting into detailed proofs. Like an album, to
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put in Wittgenstein’s wording, of theory pictures in axiomatic form. Weyl
describes his feeling about those courses as follows:
Most of it went straight over my head. But the doors of a new world swung
open for me, and I had not sat long at Hilbert’s feet before the resolution
formed itself in my young heart that I must by all means read and study
what this man had written.
Hilbert himself describes the method as methodologically the most flexible.
Why to insert deductive-oriented restrictions or formalist flavor then into
Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics?
Unfortunately, almost no recognition seems to have taken place on
what  Hilbert  meant  in  the  following  as  an  exemplary  of  his  model
theoretical conceptualizations:
The edifice of science is not raised like a dwelling, in which the foundations
are first firmly laid and only then one proceeds to construct and to enlarge
the rooms. Science prefers to secure as soon as possible comfortable spaces
to wander around and only subsequently, when signs appear here and there
that  the  loose  foundations  are  not  able  to  sustain  the  expansion  of  the
rooms, it sets about supporting and fortifying them. This is not a weakness,
but rather the right and healthy path of development.
What seems to be characteristic of Hilbert’s lectures is (1) Unified view of
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all  the  theories,  and  (2)  Interconnections  between  theories.   Such
characteristics may take us back to Hilbert’s starting point with his work in
algebraic varieties. The model theoretical character of the abstract algebraic
motivations  of  Hilbert  there  were  preliminary  to  his  later  use  of  the
axiomatic method. It is part of a general historical outlook in the nineteenth
century  meta-theoretical  searches  for  possible  solution  sets  to  the  most
central problems of the sciences where mathematics played a leading role.
The outlooks in question developed in different fields in tandem. Hilbert's
axiomatic  thoughts  provided  the  most  perceptive  conceptions  about  the
overall  interrelatedness  of  mathematical  theories.  From  a  practical
perspective,  history  teaches  that  many  studies  in  the  twentieth  century
flourished from Hilbert’s  axiomatic  thoughts.  As follow ups to  Hilbert’s
axiomatic thoughts, the development of abstract algebra, meta-mathematics,
and  computer  science  are  only parts  of  the  general  development  of  the
model-oriented investigations into the depths of mathematical and physical
theories.
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